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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Ellis timely appeals from the district court's order revoking probation. On 
appeal, Mr. Ellis argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
request for a continuance of the probation violation proceedings so he could retain 
private counsel. Mr. Ellis also argues that the district court violated his due process 
rights to notice, to prepare a defense, and to call witnesses on his behalf, when the 
district court denied his request for a continuance of the disposition portion of the 
probation revocation proceedings. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Ellis worked late into the morning and, after he completed his job, he had five 
beers with his co-workers. (Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.2-
3.) While driving home, he nearly missed hitting a police vehicle. (R, p.42.) The police 
officer activated his overhead lights, but Mr. Ellis did not yield. (R., p.42.) Mr. Ellis 
eventually got out of his car and ran into the woods. (R., p.42.) The police officer 
eventually subdued Mr. Ellis and subsequently arrested him. (R., pp.42-43.) 
In docket number 40901 (hereinafter, First Case), Mr. Ellis was charged by 
information with driving without privileges, resisting and obstructing a police officer, and 
driving without privileges (hereinafter, DUI), with a felony enhancement for having been 
convicted of two prior DUl's in the previous ten years. (R., pp.70-71.) Pursuant to a 
plea agreement, Mr. Ellis pleaded guilty to the felony DUI and, in return, the State 
agreed to dismiss the remaining charges. (08/25/06 Tr., p.9, Ls.11-20; R., pp.78-81.) 
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Thereafter, the district court imposed an indeterminate sentence of three and one-half 
years, but suspended the sentence and placed Mr. Ellis on probation.1 (R., pp.90-93.) 
After a period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation and two 
addendums alleging that Mr. Ellis violated the terms of his probation. (R., pp.115-117, 
145-146, 162-163.) Mr. Ellis admitted to violating the terms of his probation by driving 
without privileges, failing to attend relapse prevention, residing at an unapproved 
residence, testing positive for amphetamine, being present at a residence where illegal 
substances were being consumed, lying to his probation officer, and consuming alcohol. 
(R., pp.115-117, 145-146, 167-169.) The district court then found that Mr. Ellis violated 
the term of his probation by refusing to provide a urine sample, and by failing to report 
to his probation officer. (R., pp.145-146, 176.) The district court revoked probation and 
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.179-181.) Upon review of Mr. Ellis' period of retained 
jurisdiction (hereinafter, rider), the district court suspended the sentence and placed him 
on probation. (R., pp.187-191.) 
After a second period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation 
alleging that Mr. Ellis violated the terms of his probation. (R., pp.200-202.) Mr. Ellis 
admitted to violating the terms of his probation by consuming alcohol, and consuming 
methamphetamine. (R., pp.200-201, 240.) The district court found that Mr. Ellis 
violated the terms of his probation by failing to report to his probation officer. 
(R., pp.200-201, 241.) The district court continued the disposition of the probation 
violations. (R., p.243.) 
While awaiting the disposition of the foregoing probation violations, the State filed 
a new case, docket number 40890 (hereinafter, Second Case), charging Mr. Ellis, by 
1 Mr. Ellis has completely served this sentence. (03/21/13 Tr., p.46, Ls.4-5.) 
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Information, with a felony DUI, an enhancement for two DUls within fifteen years, and a 
persistent violator enhancement. (R., pp.304-306.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, 
Mr. Ellis pleaded guilty to a felony DUI and the enhancement for two DUls within fifteen 
years, and, in return, the State dismissed the persistent violator enhancement. 
(R., pp.309-311.) In the First Case, the State also filed an addendum to the report of 
probation violation based on the charges in the Second Case. (R., pp.253-254.) Based 
on the guilty plea in the Second Case, Mr. Ellis admitted to violating the terms of his 
probation in the First Case. (R., pp.309-311.) At a consolidate hearing, the district 
court revoked probation and retained jurisdiction in the First Case. (R., pp.317, 320-
322.) In the Second Case, the district court imposed a concurrent unified sentence of 
ten years, with five years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.317, 323-327.) Upon 
review of Mr. Ellis' second rider, the district court suspended the sentences and placed 
him on probation in both cases. (R., pp.333-346.) 
After a third period of probation, the State filed, in both cases, a report of 
probation violation alleging that Mr. Ellis violated the terms of his probation. 
(R., pp.357-360.) Mr. Ellis admitted to violating the terms of his probation by consuming 
alcohol, purchasing alcohol, absconding, failing to pay costs of supervision and fees, 
failing to report for a random drug test, and failing to report to an appointment. 
(R., pp.357-360, 393-394.) Mr. Ellis also admitted to violating a term of his probation by 
missing an aftercare appointment. (R., pp.359, 393-394.) However, the district court 
noted that Mr. Ellis could not attend that appointment because he was in custody. 
(R., pp.359, 393-394.) Mr. Ellis was admitted into mental health court while awaiting the 
disposition of the probation violations. (R., p.407.) The district court revoked probation 
in both cases, but suspended the sentences and placed Mr. Ellis on probation with a 
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special probation condition requiring him to complete mental health court (R., pp.409-
414.) 
After a fourth period of probation, the State filed, in both cases, a report of 
probation violation alleging that Mr. Ellis violated the terms of his probation. 
(R., pp.439-441.) Mr. Ellis admitted to violating the terms of his probation by failing to 
complete mental health court and driving without privileges. (R., pp.439-441, 449-450.) 
The district court revoked probation in both cases, and retained jurisdiction. 
(R., pp.453-454.) Upon review of Mr. Ellis' third rider, the district court suspended the 
sentences and placed him on probation in both cases. (R., pp.463-468.) 
During Mr. Ellis' fifth period of probation, an arrest warrant was issued on 
February 28, 2013, alleging that Mr. Ellis had violated the terms of his probation. 
(R., p.501.) The following day, Mr. Ellis was arraigned before a magistrate based on the 
alleged probation violations. (R., p.501.) On March 7, 2013, Mr. Ellis was terminated 
for the mental health court, in both cases. (R., p.502.) On March, 18, 2013, the State 
filed, in both cases, a report of probation violation alleging that Mr. Ellis violated the 
terms of his probation. (R., pp.503-506.) Three days after the report of probation was 
filed, Mr. Ellis made his first appearance before the district court at a hearing which was 
scheduled for a probation violation admit/deny or evidentiary hearing. (R., pp.538-541; 
03/21/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.12-16.) 
At the beginning of that hearing, Mr. Ellis' trial counsel requested a continuance 
in order to obtain an updated mental health report. (03/21/13 Tr., p.3, L.15 - p.4, L.3.) 
The district court then said it was at the court house until seven p.m. the previous 
evening and found that this request was not credible and was merely a means to delay 
the proceedings. (03/21/13 Tr., p.6, Ls.10-14.) The district court also found, based on 
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Mr. Ellis' admission, that he was competent to proceed. (03/21/13 Tr., p.6, L.14 p.7, 
L.2.) 
The district court then asked Mr. Ellis how he was going to plead to the first 
allegation contained in the report of probation violation filed three days earlier. 
(03/21/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.5-10; R., pp.503-506.) Mr. Ellis then said he wanted to retain 
counsel. (03/21/13 Tr., p.7, Ls.11-12.) The district court said that Mr. Ellis had counsel, 
and again asked Mr. Ellis how he was going to plead. (03/21/13 Tr., p.7, Ls.13-14.) 
Mr. Ellis said that he was not prepared to go forward and that he had already spoken 
with a private attorney. (03/21/13 Tr., p.7, Ls.15-17.) Mr. Ellis then said that the 
attorney he had spoken to wanted Mr. Ellis to get the proceedings continued until April 
8, 2013, which was approximately eighteen days later. (03/21/13 Tr., p.7, Ls.17-19.) 
The district court held that since the private attorney was not present and since Mr. Ellis 
had an attorney he was going to deny the motion for a continuance. (03/21/13 Tr., p.7, 
Ls.20-22.) Mr. Ellis then denied two of the allegations, but admitted that he violated the 
terms of his probation by driving without privileges. (03/21/13 Tr., p.7, L.22 - p.8, L.17; 
R., pp.503-506.) The State then withdrew the one of the remaining allegations and 
went forward to an evidentiary hearing on the other allegation. (03/21/13 Tr., p.8, L.18 -
p.9, L.4; R., pp.503-506.) The district court then found that Mr. Ellis violated the terms 
of his probation by being terminated from mental health court. (03/21 /13 Tr., p.15, 
Ls.19-23; R., pp.503-506.) 
After finding that Mr. Ellis had violated the terms of his probation, the district court 
asked both parties if they were prepared to go directly to the disposition of the probation 
violations. (03/21/13 Tr., p.15, L.23 - p.16, L.1.) Mr. Ellis' trial counsel said that he was 
not prepared to go forward with the disposition of the probation violations because he 
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had two witnesses he wanted to call but had not been able to get into contact with. 
(03/21/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.2-9.) The district court asked why the witnesses were not 
present and trial counsel said that he was not on notice that the court was going to hold 
a disposition hearing on the probation violations. (03/21/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.10-16.) Trial 
counsel also told the district court that he only needed one week to be prepared for a 
disposition hearing and that it would only take approximately half-an-hour. (03/21/13 
Tr., p.16, Ls.6-9.) The district court then asked trial counsel to provide an offer of proof 
as to the witnesses' potential testimony. (03/21 /13 Tr., p.17, Ls.17-18.) Trial counsel 
said he was not quite sure what the testimony would be but it would probably indicate 
that he has not been drinking and driving. (03/21/13 Tr., p.16, L.19 - p.18, L.25.) Trial 
counsel then said Mr. Ellis would like to have his sponsor testify and his sponsor would 
say Mr. Ellis has been working a twelve-step program and remained sober. (03/21/13 
Tr., p.18, Ls.1-6.) The district court then asked the State to opine about Mr. Ellis' 
request for a continuance as to the disposition hearing, and the State responded it had 
no position and would be available for the continued hearing. (03/21/13 Tr., p.17, Ls.9-
12.) The district court then accepted all of trial counsel's representations regarding the 
offers of proof and denied Mr. Ellis' request for a continuance. (03/21/13 Tr., p.18, Ls.7-
11.) The district court also noted that it would not consider any unproven allegations 
that Mr. Ellis had been drinking and driving. (03/21/13 Tr., p.18, Ls.11-19.) The district 
court revoked probation and imposed the underlying sentences. (R., pp.543-544.) At 
the end of the disposition portion of the probation violation proceedings, the district court 
explained that it denied the request for a continuance for appointed counsel because it 
thought the request was a delay tactic. (03/21/13 Tr., p.49, Ls.8-14.) Mr. Ellis timely 
appealed. (R., pp.545-547.) 
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ISSUES 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Ellis' request for a 
continuance in order to retain private counsel? 
2. Did the district court deny Mr. Ellis due process when it refused to continue the 
disposition portion of the probation revocation hearing, which was requested in 
order for Mr. Ellis to prepare a defense and call witnesses to testify on his 
behalf? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Ellis' Request For A 
Continuance In Order To Retain Private Counsel 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Ellis argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his 
request for a continuance at the final probation violation hearing. Specifically, he 
argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his request for a 
continuance in order to retain counsel. As such, he argues that he was denied a right to 
retained counsel throughout his probation violation proceedings. 
B. Standard Of Review 
An abuse of discretion standard is used to determine whether a district court 
should have granted a request for a continuance. State v. Ward, 98 Idaho 571, 574 
(1977). "When a district court's discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the 
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine whether the lower court 
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted within the boundaries of such 
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices 
before it, and reached its decision by an exercise of reason." State v. Knutsen, 138 
Idaho 918, 923 (Ct. App. 2003). 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Ellis' Request For A 
Continuance In Order For Him To Retain Private Counsel 
Generally, it has been held that unless an appellant shows that his substantial 
rights have been prejudiced by reason of a denial of his motion for continuance, 
appellate courts can only conclude that there was no abuse of discretion. State v. 
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Laws, 94 Idaho 200, 202 (1971 ). The Idaho Supreme Court held that "probationers 
have an unqualified federal due process right to retained counsel at probation 
revocation hearings .... " State v. Young, 122 Idaho 278, 283 (1992). "Trial judges 
necessarily require a great deal of latitude in scheduling trials. Not the least of their 
problems is that of assembling the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the same place at 
the same time, and this burden counsels against continuances except for compelling 
reasons." State v. Cagle, 126 Idaho 794, 797 (Ct. App. 1995). "[O]nly an unreasoning 
and arbitrary 'insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for 
delay' violates the right to assistance of counsel. State v. Carman, 114 Idaho 791, 793 
(Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964)). "Therefore, a 
request for new counsel should be examined with the rights and interests of the 
defendant in mind, tempered by exigencies of judicial economy." Id. Idaho appellate 
courts analyze the following factors when evaluating a district court's order denying a 
request for a continuance in order to obtain substitute counsel: 
[T]he timing of the motion; the requested length of delay, including 
whether the delay is an attempt to manipulate the proceedings; the 
number, if any, of similar continuances sought by the defendant; 
inconvenience to witnesses; any prejudice to the prosecution; whether an 
irreconcilable conflict exists between the accused and counsel; and the 
qualifications possessed by present counsel. 
Cagle, 126 Idaho at 797. An application of the foregoing factors leads to the conclusion 
that the district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Ellis' request for a 
continuance in regard to his mental health issues. 
The timing of the motion in this matter supports Mr. Ellis' position. Mr. Ellis 
recognizes that his motion for the continuance occurred on the day of his probation 
violation hearing. (03/21/13 Tr., p.3, Ls.1-20.) However, there was very little time in this 
matter for Mr. Ellis to prepare for that hearing, because the report of the probation 
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violations which contained the official allegations against Mr. Ellis was filed on 
March 18, 2013, and the probation violation hearing was held three days later on 
March 21, 2013. (03/21/13 Tr., p.3, Ls.1-20.) 
Mr. Ellis' ability to prepare for this hearing was impeded by his unstable mental 
health condition. (03/21/13 Tr., p.5, Ls.16-19.) Specifically, trial counsel told the district 
court that Mr. Ellis was "extremely overwhelmed" at the hearing and that he had made a 
request with his medical provider, Dr. Rhodes, months before the probation hearing in 
order to get his medications changed. (03/21/13 Tr., p.3, L.15- p.4, L.3.) 
Mr. Ellis' claims that he was mentally unstable are credible as he was previously 
found a viable candidate for mental health court. (R., pp.415-435, 469-500; PSI, p.140.) 
During the hearing, the district court also found that Mr. Ellis' claims that he was not 
stable on his medications was not credible because it was the first time in three years 
he had heard such a claim. (03/21/13 Tr., p.48, Ls.3-6.) However, at the July 19, 2010, 
mental health court hearing, Mr. Ellis claimed his medications were outdated. 
(R., p.472.) At the December 13, 2012 hearing, he was not taking his medications. 
(R., p.490.) 
The length of the delay and the State's prejudice are not significant factors in this 
matter. Mr. Ellis only requested an eighteen-day delay. (03/21/13 Tr., p.7, Ls.15-19.) 
Mr. Ellis had already communicated with private counsel about the eighteen-day delay, 
which ensured that private counsel would make an appearance for Mr. Ellis. (03/21/13 
Tr., p.7, Ls.15-19.) When asked about the continuance in regard to the updated mental 
health evaluation, the State did not object to a continuance, which evinces a lack of 
perceived prejudice by the State. (03/21/13 Tr., p.4, L.21 - p.5, L.6.) Additionally, this 
was only a probation hearing so there was no jury empanelled at the time of the request 
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for the continuance. (03/21/13 Tr., p.3, Ls.1-11.) The State only called two witnesses 
at the evidentiary portion of the hearing. (03/21/13 Tr., p.8, L.1 - p.14, L.18.) 
Additionally, this was the first request for a continuance. (R., pp.501-502, 538.) 
In sum, Mr. Ellis only had three days between the filing of the report of his 
alleged probation violations and the probation revocation hearing. Mr. Ellis told the 
district court that he was not mentally stable enough to go forward with the proceedings 
and needed a continuance in order to be represented by retained counsel. Only at the 
end of the disposition portion of the proceedings did the district court explain that it 
thought the request for a continuance to retain substitute counsel was a delay tactic. 
However, that concern is far outweighed by Mr. Ellis' right to retained counsel at a 
probation violation disposition hearing. 
11. 
The District Court Denied Mr. Ellis Due Process When It Refused To Continue The 
Disposition Portion Of The Probation Revocation Hearing. Which Was Requested To 
Afford Mr. Ellis The Opportunity To Prepare A Defense And Call Witnesses To Testify 
On His Behalf 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Ellis argues that the district court violated his due process rights when it 
failed to grant his request for a continuance of the disposition portion of the probation 
violation proceedings. Specifically, he argues that he was never provided notice that 
the March 21, 2013 hearing, was scheduled for a disposition hearing. Mr. Ellis also 
argues that due to the foregoing error, his due process rights were further violated 
because he was also precluded from preparing a defense and calling witnesses on his 
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behalf. As such, this case must be remanded for another probation violation disposition 
hearing and Mr. Ellis must be afforded the opportunity to call witnesses. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The applicable standard of review regarding a district court's decision to deny a 
continuance is contained in Section 18, supra, and is incorporated herein by reference 
thereto. 
C. The District Court Denied Mr. Ellis Due Process When It Refused To Continue 
The Disposition Portion Of The Probation Revocation Hearing Which Was 
Requested To Afford Mr. Ellis The Opportunity To Prepare A Defense And Call 
Witnesses To Testify On His Behalf 
Generally, it has been held that unless an appellant shows that his substantial 
rights have been prejudiced by reason of a denial of his motion for continuance, 
appellate courts can only conclude that there was no abuse of discretion. State v. 
Laws, 94 Idaho 200, 202 (1971 ). A probationer is entitled to State and Federal due 
process protections throughout the probation revocation proceedings. State v. Kelsey, 
115 Idaho 311, 314 (1988). These due process protections include a right to notice and 
two hearings. State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 149, 150-151 (1986). The first hearing is 
to determine whether the probationer violated a term of the probation agreement. Id. at 
151. 'The second hearing is one to determine if the [probation] violation justifies 
revocation of [probation]." Id. Additionally, a probationer has a due process right to 
prepare and present witnesses during the probation revocation proceedings. Id. 
Mr. Ellis argues that his substantial rights to due process were violated when the district 
court denied his request for a continuance of the probation violation disposition hearing. 
The following events are the basis for Mr. Ellis' due process claims. After 
Mr. Ellis admitted to one of the probation violation allegations and the district court 
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found that Mr. Ellis violated a term of his probation agreement, the district court asked 
the State if it was ready to proceed to the disposition of the probation violations and the 
State said it was prepared. (03/21/13 Tr., p.15, Ls.19-25.) When Mr. Ellis was asked 
the same question, the following dialogue occurred: 
Trial Counsel: 
The Court: 
Trial Counsel: 
The Court: 
No, Your Honor. I would like the opportunity, in 
speaking with Mr. Ellis, to call a couple of witnesses 
on his behalf. Specifically, I'm thinking about calling 
his mother and his girlfriend. His mother's not here 
today. I have not been able to get a hold of her, and 
so I would ask the Court to set this out for next week. 
I can be prepared to go on Thursday and have my 
witnesses all lined up. 
[W]hat is the reason why those witnesses aren't here 
today? 
Well, Your Honor, this was just simply the admit/deny 
hearing on it, and he did deny. We went directly to 
evidentiary, and I guess at this point in time that's all I 
can let the Court know. They simply are not here. 
All right. What, as an offer of proof, would these 
witnesses testify about? 
(03/21/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.1-18.) Trial counsel noted that the State recommended prison 
and Mr. Ellis was going to request probation. (03/21/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.19-25.) Trial 
counsel then said that his mother would testify that Mr. Ellis has been doing well on 
probation and provided some other mitigating information. (03/21/13 Tr., p.17, Ls.1-9.) 
The district court asked the State what its position was as to the request for a one-week 
continuance, and the State said it had no opinion and would be available for the a 
disposition hearing the following week. (03/21/13 Tr., p.17, Ls.9-12.) Trial counsel then 
said he anticipated that he would not need more than one-half hour to conduct the 
hearing. (03/21/13 Tr., p.17, Ls.13-14.) 
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The district court then asked trial counsel what his mother would specifically 
testify about. (03/21/13 Tr., p.17, Ls.15-16.) Trial counsel responded, "Well, your 
honor, I don't know. I'm assuming that she - - I'm not quite sure, to be honest with the 
Court. I think she can testify that he has lived with her and, ... has seen him in the 
community. (03/21/13 Tr., p.17, Ls.17-20.) Trial counsel also said that she would rebut 
allegations that Mr. Ellis had been drinking and driving while on probation. (03/21/13 
Tr., p.17, Ls.20-25.) Trial counsel then stated that Mr. Ellis wanted his "sponsor" to 
testify that Mr. Ellis was "clean and working the steps." (03/21/13 Tr., p.18, Ls.1-6.) 
The district court accepted the offers of proof as the truth and said it would not consider 
any unproven allegations that Mr. Ellis had been drinking and driving, denied the 
request for a continuance, and proceeded to disposition. (03/21/13 Tr., p.18, Ls.18, 
Ls.7-19.) 
Mr. Ellis first argues that his due process rights were violated because he never 
received notice that the March 21, 2013 hearing, was going to include the disposition 
portion of the probation revocation proceedings. As stated above, probationers have a 
due process right to notice as to both the guilt phase and the disposition phase of the 
probation violation proceedings. Chapman, 111 Idaho at 151. According to trial 
counsel, Mr. Ellis was only put on notice that the March 21, 2013 hearing was 
scheduled for an admit/deny hearing, not a disposition hearing. (03/21/13 Tr., p.16, 
Ls.2-16.) It is also important to note that trial counsel requested a continuance as he 
was not prepared for disposition due to the lack of notice. 
Based on the lack of notice, Mr. Ellis also argues that his due process rights were 
violated when the district court refused to grant the continuance to afford Mr. Ellis the 
opportunity to prepare a defense and call witnesses on his behalf. As mentioned 
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above, a probationer has a due process right to prepare a defense and call witnesses 
during probation violation proceedings. Chapman, 111 Idaho at 151. Even if a 
probationer is denied this right s/he must also establish prejudice, which requires the 
probationer to make a showing that the witnesses' testimony would have been material 
and favorable. State v. Hanslovan, 116 Idaho 266, 268 (Ct. App. 1989); See also 
Bradford v. State, 124 Idaho 788, 792 (Ct. App. 1993). In this case, the district court 
provided Mr. Ellis an opportunity to make the required showing and he complied with 
the requirement. (03/21/13 Tr., p.16, L.19 - p.18, L.6.) Specially, he said he would call 
his mother and his sponsor and they would rebut any allegations that he was drinking 
and driving and that he was doing well on probation. (03/21/13 Tr., p.16, L.19 - p.18, 
L.6.) His sponsor would also testify he was working the steps of a rehabilitation 
program. (03/21/13 Tr., p.18, Ls.1-6.) This information is both material and favorable 
for Mr. Ellis, because when determining whether to revoke or continue probation, a 
district court must analyze the goals of protection of society and rehabilitation. State v. 
Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001 ). Mr. Ellis' offers of proof directly concern 
these two goals. As such, Mr. Ellis can establish that the district court's denial of his 
request for a continuance violated his due process right to call witnesses and that he 
was prejudiced because of that denial. 
Mr. Ellis recognizes that the State will probably argue that the denial of the 
continuance was harmless because the district court accepted Mr. Ellis' offers of proof 
as to the witnesses' testimony. (03/21/13 Tr., p.18, Ls.7-19.) However, affirming the 
district court on that basis would allow the district court to circumvent the due process 
rights mandated by the Idaho Supreme Court in Chapman, supra. The notion that a 
probationer has a due process right to call witnesses becomes meaningless if a trial 
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court only needs to ask the probationer what the witnesses would say, then accept the 
offers of proof as the truth and deny the probationer an opportunity to call the witnesses. 
Moreover, since a probationer is required to provide a summary of their witnesses' 
testimony in order to establish prejudice on an appeal from an order denying a request 
for a continuance, using that offer of proof as a substitute for the witnesses' actual 
testimony means there is no actual right to call witnesses at a probation revocation 
proceedings because such a practice denies a probationer a remedy for a violation of 
that right to call witnesses. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803) ("[l]t is a 
general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal 
remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded.")(quoting William 
Blackstone, Commentaries (3d vol. *23)). Even assuming the error is harmless, the 
district court's acceptance of the offers of proof did not overcome the due process 
violations of Mr. Ellis' right to notice and to prepare a defense. 
Mr. Ellis further argues that the denial of his request for a continuance was "only 
an unreasoning and arbitrary 'insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable 
request for delay,"' which violated his right to prepare a defense and call witnesses. 
Carman, 114 Idaho at 793 (quoting Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589). The request for the 
continuance was only for a week-long delay, and the State had no objection and said it 
was available for the hearing. (03/21/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.6-9, p.17, L.9-14.) While the 
district court provided reasons why it denied the request for a continuance for Mr. Ellis 
mental health issues and his request for counsel (03/21/13 Tr., p.5, L.20 -p.7, L.10, 
p.49, Ls.8-17), there was no expressed rationale provided by the district court for 
denying his request for a continuance of the disposition portion of the probation 
proceedings, other than the district court's acceptance of Mr. Ellis' offers of proof as to 
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the content of his witnesses' testimony. However, that rationale, as argued above, is 
circular and denied him a remedy for a denial of his right to call witnesses. As such, 
due to the district court's lack of an explanation for denying Mr. Ellis request for a 
continuance and due to the State's lack of an objection, the district court's denial of a 
request for a continuance was unreasoned and arbitrary. 
In sum, Mr. Ellis was not put on notice that the March 21, 2013 hearing, was 
going to include the disposition portion of the probation revocation proceedings and, 
due to that lack of notice, he was not able to prepare a defense and call witnesses 
during that portion of the proceedings. The district court provided no rationale for its 
decision to deny this specific request for a continuance and the State did not object to 
the continuance. As such, the district court's decision to deny the continuance was 
unreasoned and arbitrary and violated Mr. Ellis' due process rights to notice, to prepare 
a defense, and to call witnesses on his behalf. As such, this matter must be remanded 
for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Ellis respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 21 st day of March, 2014. 
SHAWN F. WILKERSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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